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CASENOTE
United States v. Rohm and Haas
Company: Under CERCLA,
Government Cannot Collect Expenses
for Overseeing Private Party Cleanups
I.

INTRODUCTION

United States v. Rohm and Haas Company' presents an important
issue of first impression regarding the extent of a responsible party's

liability under section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"). Specifi-

cally, the issue the court faced was whether section 107, allowing the
government to recoup its expenditure when it conducts a cleanup of a
,hazardous waste site, contemplates the recovery of costs incurred by the
government when it merely oversees a private party's cleanup of a
hazardous waste site?

Congress enacted CERCLA to protect the public from health
hazards in the environment caused by improper hazardous waste
disposal.4 CERCLA authorizes the federal government, through the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), to clean up hazardous waste
sites and recover costs from the parties improperly disposing the wastes.'

Congress envisioned and intended for CERCLA to deal with hazardous
waste sites in a cost-effective manner.6

This note examines whether the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
interpreted section 107 of CERCLA consistent with congressional intent
when it ruled that the costs the EPA incurred to monitor and oversee a

1.

2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993).
2. CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 107, 94 Stat. 2767, 2781 (1980) as amended by
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99499,100
Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988 & Supp. 1984)).
3. 2 F.3d at 1267-68. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988 & Supp. 1994) authorizes the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") to conduct a governmental response action. See infra notes 38-46
and accompanying text for an explanation of CERCLA's governmental response mechanism.
4. The stated purpose of CERCLA include: obtaining an inventory of inactive hazardous
waste sites, prioritizing sites based on relative danger, establishing response program to
contain and eliminate releases to protect the public health and the environment. H.R. Rep.
No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 25 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A. 6119, 6128.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9674 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
6. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 25 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6128.
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private party's hazardous waste cleanup were not recoverable. This note
argues that the court's decision helps fulfill CERCLA's purpose-to
effectuate cleanup of the environment in the most cost-effective manner-by indirectly providing financial incentives that encourage private
corrective actions over governmental response actions. This note also
discusses how the court's decision furthers the notion that the EPA
should be accountable for operating efficiently.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
U.S. v. Rohm and Haas arose when the EPA sought reimbursement
of costs it incurred to oversee Rohm and Haas' cleanup of a hazardous
waste site.7 At issue was a 120-acre landfill in Bristol, Pennsylvania,
which the Rohm and Haas Company had used as a landfill for disposal
of general refuse, process wastes, and offgrade products from its plastics
and chemical manufacturing plants!
The site first came to the attention of the EPA when Rohm and
Haas reported to a congressional subcommittee that it had disposed of
wastes at the landfill.9 Hence, beginning in 1979, the EPA began
monitoring activities at the site. 10 In 1981, Rohm and Haas notified the
EPA that it had disposed 309,000 tons of waste at the landfill, including
at least 4,600 tons of hazardous substances." Subsequent investigations
by both the EPA and Rohm and Haas found hazardous substances
present at the site in the air, soil, and groundwater."
Subsequently, in 1985, the EPA moved to begin a cleanup of the
landfill with its authority under CERCLA. 3 The EPA proposed to add
the site to the "Superfund List"-the popular name for the National
Priorities List ("NPL")14 that consists of sites supervised by the EPA
under CERCLA.' Pursuant to section 106 of CERCLA, the EPA sent
Rohm-and Haas a consent order compelling Rohm and Haas to clean up
the site at its own expense. In addition, the consent order contained

7. 2 F.3d at 1268.
8. Id.
9. U.S. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 790 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1992).

10. 2 F.3d at 1268.
II. Id.
12. Id.

13. Id.
14. One of the requirements of CERCLA is that the EPA establish a list of abandoned or

uncontrolled hazardous waste sites and update it annually. The EPA is to rank each site
using a rating system to determine the degree of hazard with respect of its priority for

cleanup.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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provisions ordering reimbursement of all of the government's response
and oversight costs. 7 Rohm and Haas did not sign the consent order,
but sent a letter to EPA stating that the site was inappropriate for
handling under CERCLA and instead should be managed under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"). 8 In its
letter, Rohm and Haas proposed to take corrective action and clean up
the site at its own expense under RCRA. 19
EPA agreed, informing Rohm and Haas in 1987 that the site
would be managed under RCRA.2 After years of negotiation, in 1989,
Rohm and Haas and the EPA entered into an Administrative Consent
Order pursuant to RCRA for Rohm and Haas to perform various cleanup
related activities on the site at its own expense.2 ' Contrary to the
formerly proposed order, however, this order did not contain a provision
enabling the EPA to recoup its oversight costs of the cleanup by Rohm
and Haas.'
Nevertheless, after Rohm and Haas performed the required work
at the site, the United States brought suit under section 107 of CERCLA
against the Rohm and Haas Company to recover all costs that the EPA
incurred since 1979 related to the cleanup of the 120-acre landfill.3
Specifically, the EPA sued for the $401,348 it incurred in sampling and
analyzing substances at the site, as well as in monitoring, assessing, and
evaluating Rohm and Haas' activities at the site.' Following a bench
trial in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the
court held that the EPA could recover all its costs plus interests,
including oversight costs, under CERCLA for a private party's cleanup
of a hazardous waste site managed under RCRA. Rohm and Haas
appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed the decision of the District Court, holding that the government's
oversight costs were not recoverable as "removal" costs under section 107
of CERCLA.

17. Id.
18. RCRA, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 27% (1976) as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-609, 92
Stat. 3081 (1978) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988 &Supp. 1994)); see
infra notes 31-44 and accompanying text for an explanation of how RCRA and CERCLA differ.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. U.S. v. Rohm and Haas Co., 790 F. Supp. 1255, 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
24. Id. at 1257-59.
25. Id. at 1264.
26. 2 F.3d at 1278.
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III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
U.S. v. Rohm and Haas involved two regulatory statutes-RCRA
and CERCLA. Rohm and Haas had consented to an EPA order to clean
up its landfill pursuant to RCRA.' However, RCRA contains no
authority for the EPA to recover the expenses it incurs in overseeing
Thus, the EPA claimed that its
corrective action under RCRA. 2
oversight costs are recoverable under section 107 of CERCLA, a wholly
separate statutory scheme from RCRA. Therefore, a threshold issue before
the court' was whether the EPA could use section 107 of CERCLA to
recover the costs it incurred in monitoring a private party's cleanup of a
hazardous waste site managed under RCRA.
Despite the involvement of two comprehensive and complex
environmental statutes, the court was able to explain its legal analysis in
a simple, well-organized manner. As a preliminary matter, the court had
to decide whether CERCLA preempts any conflicting or companion
legislative scheme, such as RCRA.' Accordingly, the court began its
analysis by providing brief synopses of the regulatory structures of both
RCRA and CERCLA, followed by a description of a typical corrective
action and incorporating the two regulatory structures to emphasize their
differences.
Finding that CERCLA explicitly imposes liability on responsible
parties regardless of what statutory tool the EPA utilizes in effecting a
corrective action, the court narrowed the dispositive issue to whether the
CERCLA definition of "removal" included expenses associated with
government oversight of removal actions conducted and paid for solely
by private parties.'
A. CERCLA versus RCRA: Similarities and Differences in Functions
and Purposes
The two regulatory statutes involved in this case, RCRA and
CERCLA, have different goals. Although they share similar environmental concerns, they reflect divergent approaches: RCRA is regulatory in
nature, while CERCLA is remedial in nature.3' Under RCRA, the EPA's
role is essentially to regulate existing hazardous substances by monitoring
the actions of owners and operators of waste disposal sites through a

27. Id. at 1268.

28. Id.at 1272.
29. Id.at 1274.
30. Id.at 1273.
31. Id. at 1269-70 (emphasis added).
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permit system.' Under this system, all persons owning and operating,
generating, transporting, treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous
waste must obtain a permit by demonstrating that he or she will conduct
such activities pursuant to strict standards set by the EPA.' Among
these standards is the additional requirement to conduct corrective action
in response to past releases of hazardous waste.' Therefore, while
RCRA primarily operates to regulate the present actions of owners and
operators of waste disposal sites in a preventive fashion, it also overlaps
with CERCLA by including remedial actions. For example, in the case of
waste that presents an imminent and substantial danger to health or the
environment, RCRA authorizes EPA to sue for an injunction stopping any
person from contributing to the disposal and requiring such other action
as may be necessary.' Except for situations involving past releases of
hazardous wastes, RCRA's permitting program is primarily "prospective.' '3
On the other hand, CERCLA is remedial in nature, as it establishes a system for identifying and cleaning up hazardous substances already
released into the environment.37 Under CERCLA, the EPA itself can
monitor, test, and analyze any site and remedy hazardous waste
problems. CERCLA provides two separate mechanisms for cleaning up
waste sites: (1) a government cleanup under section 104, followed by a
cost recovery action under section 107, and (2) a private party cleanup at
its own expense ordered by the EPA under section 106.1 The EPA
decides whether to conduct a response action under section 104, to
require private corrective action under section 106, or to utilize its
authority under RCRA.
Then, in order to fund the costs of such remedial actions,
CERCLA created the Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k) (1988 & Supp. 1994). For a synopsis of the mechanics of
RCRA, see Susan M. Cooke, The Law of Hazardous Waste: Management, Cleanup, Liability,
and Litigation 157, 157-184 (1987).
33. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 262-268 (1994).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u),(v) (1988 & Supp. 1994); 40 C.F.R. § 264.101 (1994). RCRA's
corrective action program was added by the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of
1984 and was designed to identify and remedy environmental contamination at all facilities
that hold hazardous waste permits under RCRA. H. I Rep. No. 198,98th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
pt. 1, at 20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5578.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
36. 2 F.3d at 1269.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (1988 & Supp. 1994); see also Cooke, supra note 32, at 185-200.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604, 9606, 9607 (1988 & Supp. 1994). If the persons responsible for the
release of a hazardous substance fail to respond properly to an EPA order, they may be
liable to the United States for punitive damages up to three times the amount of the costs
incurred by the government, and possibly a fine of $25,000 per day for failure to comply
with an administrative order. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b)(1), 9607(c)(3) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
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("Superfund")," which is primarily funded by taxes on the oil and
chemical industries. The Superfund acts as a rotating fund that the
government uses to conduct remedial actions and then replenishes by
collecting from responsible parties (whose liability is established).4'
Lastly, CERCLA's site remediation program addresses hazardous
substances wherever located. It applies primarily to past waste disposal
sites, which are not covered by RCRA, particularly so-called "orphaned
sites" for which a solvent responsible party cannot be identified.42
In situations such as the present matter where both CERCLA and
RCRA apply at a contaminated waste site, the EPA developed its
NPL/RCRA deferral policy, which dictates that one or the other, but not
both, programs should be used to effectuate the cleanup.' 3 In deferring
CERCLA remedial action when RCRA corrective action is available, the
EPA preserves the limited resources of the Superfund program for sites
that are not subject to RCRA corrective action and allows RCRA-regulated persons to conserve their limited financial resources for carrying the
burden of one, rather than multiple cleanup contracts."
As such, CERCLA differs in basic purpose from RCRA. RCRA
generally establishes a cradle-to-grave regulatory program for present
hazardous waste activities, whereas CERCLA establishes a comprehensive
response program for past hazardous waste activities.
B. Contentions of the Parties
Section 107 sets forth the basic elements of liability under
CERCLA. The EPA can bring actions to effectuate removal of hazardous
substances and invoke section 107 which mandates that responsible
parties bear the cost of such actions. Furthermore, section 107(a) imposes
liability for removal actions "notwithstanding any other provision or rule
of law, and subject only to the defenses" explicitly enumerated in

39. CERCLA, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 111, 94 Stat. at 2801 (1980) (codified as amended in
42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988 & Supp. 1994)).
40. See Cooke, supra note 32, at 189.
41. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a),(b), & (d) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
42. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text for discussion regarding the role of the
National Priorities List under CERCLA.
43. 53 Fed. Reg. 30,005 (1988); 48 Fed. Reg. 40,658, 40,662 (1983) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §
300 (1994)).
44. An undesirable feature of CERCLA is that owners end up paying the EPA for one set
of contractors to "oversee!' the work done by other contractors retained by the owner to
conduct the studies and to do the cleanup work. J. Stanton Curry et al., Symposium on
Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste: The Tug-Of-War Between RCRA and CERCLA At
Contaminated Hazardous Waste Facilities,23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 359, 392 (1991).
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CERCLA.4s Because of the sweeping terms of the clause, both parties
in the litigation conceded that facilities subject to regulation under RCRA
may, in certain circumstances, be subject to government removal and
remedial action under section 107 of CERCLA. The parties further agreed
that given the circumstances of the case, if the costs of the oversight
activities were recoverable under section 107, they would fall under
"removal" rather than "remedial" activities.4 The court thus narrowed
the fundamental issue to "whether the government's oversight of a
cleanup paid for and conducted by private parties constitutes a government 'removal' at all." 7
The EPA argued that its oversight activities literally came within
the definition of a "removal" action because oversight of a RCRA
"corrective" action is equivalent to a CERCLA "removal" action, making
the defendants liable under section 107.4' Taking a contrary view, Rohm
and Haas argued that there was no evidence supporting the idea that
oversight costs in the definition of
Congress intended to include
"removal" found in CERCLA.49 Rohm and Haas proposed "that Congress
viewed EPA's overseeing of a private party's removal activities as
qualitatively different from EPA's actually performing removal activities." s° Therefore, Congress intended for EPA to recover the costs of the
latter, but not the costs of the former.5'
C. Standard for Review
Having established that the underlying basis for the issue at stake
rests on statutory interpretation of "removal" under section 107 of
CERCLA, the court had to decide on an appropriate standard of review
applicable to the statute. The court followed the standard established in
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc.
v. United States.' Under this standard, in order to find oversight costs
recoverable "there must be a clear congressional intent, reflected in the
language of the statute."'
National Cable involved a constitutional challenge to regulatory
fees assessed by the. Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"). The
45. 2 F.3d at 1272.
46. Id. at 1271. In general, removal actions are short term responses to a release or a threat
of release while remedial actions involve long term remedies. Id.

47. Id.at 1273.
48. Id.at 1272.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974).

53. 2 F.3d at 1273.
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petitioners argued that the fees were more like taxes because the fees at
issue were levied arbitrarily and without respect to any benefit conferred
on the regulated party.' Therefore Congress had unconstitutionally
delegated its exclusive taxing power to the FCC, an executive agency.S
The Supreme Court later interpreted National Cable in Skinner v.Mid-America Pipeline Co. as standing for the proposition that "Congress must
indicate clearly its intention to delegate to the Executive the discretionary
authority to recover administrative costs not inuring directly to the
benefit of regulated parties by imposing additional financial burdens,
whether characterized as 'fees' or 'taxes' on those parties."' By its
reliance on Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co.'s interpretation of National
Cable, the Rohm and Haas court recognized National Cable as having
evolved into a rule of administrative law and statutory construction.
The court questioned the nature of the oversight costs at issue to
clarify its purpose in the realm of CERCLA's environmental protection
law. On one hand, the oversight costs were costs incurred by the
government to monitor private parties' compliance with their legal
obligations imposed by CERCLA. 7 However, delving deeper into the
heart of the matter, the court found significant the fact that these legal
obligations imposed by the government were ultimately intended to
protect the public interest rather than the interest of those being overseen.' As such, the court analogized the oversight costs as "administrative costs" of the kind discussed in National Cable, i.e., "administrative
costs not inuring directly to the benefit of regulated parties, but rather to
the public at large. "' The Rohm and Haas court "believe[di the guiding
principle of National Cable to be a sound one, particularly as applied in
this case. " ' 0
By adopting the National Cable standard, the court displayed an
interest in the efficient operation of executive agencies such as the EPA.
'The budget and appropriation process gives executive agencies an
incentive to operate efficiently and makes them accountable to Congress.
When an agency asserts the right to secure financing of its activities by
assessing its costs against those whom it regulates, that incentive and
accountability are lost."6' Since requiring regulated parties to bear the
burden of administrative costs incurred by the overseeing agency is not

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

National Cable, 415 U.S. at 337.
Id. at 340-41.
Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 224 (1989).
2 F.3d at 1273.
2 F.3d at 1273 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
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the norm, the Rohm and Haas court would not presume Congress to have
created such an effect without clear and explicit statutory language.62
Lastly, the court was unpersuaded that the Chevron doctrine a
applied to the circumstances of this case." Despite the EPA's long
tenured authority under CERCLA and RCRA, Rohm and Haas represents
the first action in which the EPA has sought reimbursement of so-called
CERCLA costs for a site that it managed under RCRA. Since EPA did not
explicitly adopt the position that it could recover its RCRA oversight
costs under CERCLA until this case was filed-more than a decade after
CERCLA was enacted-the court was reluctant to give deference to the
EPA's new interpretation of "removal."' The court questioned the
appropriateness of giving deference to "what appears to be nothing more
than an agency's convenient litigation position .... "
D.

Definition of Removal: Is Overseeing Cleanup a "Removal"?

Under section 107 of CERCLA the government is entitled to
reimbursement of oversight costs if, and only if, the costs of overseeing
a private party's cleanup constitutes a government "removal" action.
Section 101 of CERCLA defines "removal" as
the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from
the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken [sic]
in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances
into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of
hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the
taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent,
minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare
or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a
release or threat of release... 67

62. Id.
63. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
64. 2 F.3d at 1274 n.14.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988)). Note the contrary
position the EPA took in Colorado v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 948 (D. Colo. 1994), where
Colorado sought to recover from the federal government oversight costs the state incurred
in connection with the cleanup of some federal land. Contrary to its position in Rohm and
Haas just months earlier, but faced this time with oversight liability, the EPA argued that
the states oversight activity did, not fall under the definition of removal as defined in
CERCLA. Id. at 951.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988 & Supp. 1994).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 35

The court provided three reasons why oversight activity is not a
removal for purposes of section 107 liability. First, nowhere in the
definition of removal is there an explicit reference to oversight of
activities conducted and paid for by a private party.' Nevertheless, the
EPA 'contended that the requisite clear statement of congressional intent
that oversight costs may be recovered is found in one of the five
categories in the statutory definition of removal: "such actions as may be
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release
of hazardous substances. " Contrary to the EPA's position, the court
interpreted the language as referring to actions the appropriate government agency takes at the assessment stage of a typical cleanup, not
actions occurring during the execution of a cleanup.'
Second, since Congress was already familiar with the concept of
forcing responsible parties to conduct necessary removal or remedial
action, as evidenced by a similar mechanism in RCRA, the omission of
language authorizing reimbursement of oversight costs was probably
intentional." Furthermore, because of the haste in which CERCLA was
enacted, the court found it likely that Congress intentionally omitted any
mention of oversight or government activities conducted under section
106 in the definition of removal under section 107. The court also found
it significant that no environmental statute predating CERCLA authorizes
the EPA to collect from regulated parties its costs for monitoring
compliance with the law, despite the fact that provisions which allow
EPA to force private parties to undertake corrective action at their own
expense is a favorite policy tool of Congress, and one that can be found
in a number of environmental statutes, such as RCRA, the Federal Clean
Water Act, and the Safe Drinking Water Act.' Thus, the court was
persuaded that the established practice of financing oversight activities
from congressionally-appropriated funds was intentionally carried
through to CERCLA's regulatory scheme. Therefore, allowing the EPA to
recover the cost of overseeing private corrective actions under respective
environmental statutes would represent a major policy change.
Third, the court found support in section 111(c)(8) of CERCLA
that Congress did not intend to include oversight costs in the definition
of removal. 3 Section 111 provides six different categories of payments

68. 2 F.3d at 1275.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
70. 2 F.3d at 1276; see supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
mechanics of CERCLA corrective actions.
71. Id. at 1276.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1277.
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that can be made from the Superfund. 74 Since section 111 stands as
express authority that oversight costs were to be paid from the Superfund, the court suggested that Congress intended to omit oversight in the
definition of removal in section 107.' "Had Congress intended oversight
to be included in removal, they probably would have exemplified it as
another category in their definition of removal activities."76
Having determined that overseeing a private party's cleanup did
not constitute a government "removal," the court proceeded to define the
parameters of the term. To illustrate, when the government takes direct
action to investigate or monitor the release or threatened release of
hazardous substances, those activities are a "removal" and all of the
government's costs are recoverable." Those costs include testing to see
if a hazard has been eliminated and the investigation needed to determine the most appropriate way to correct the hazard.' On the other
hand, when the government is overseeing the performance of a private
party involved in the cleanup, but not the hazardous situation itself, the
government cannot recover its monitoring costs.' Thus, the Rohm and
Haas court determined that the government's role in overseeing a private
cleanup effort is far removed from any sort of literal government
"removal" as Congress envisioned and intended in CERCLA and is
therefore not recoverable by the government.'
IV. DISCUSSION
A.

The Court's Deference to the Agreement of the Parties

While resolution of this case depended on statutory interpretation, the Rohm and Haas decision reflected a careful assessment of what
the parties agreed to in their consent order. In 1985, when the EPA
proposed to put the landfill on the Superfund List to supervise the
cleanup under CERCLA, Rohm and Haas submitted a letter in opposition.'1 Rohm and Haas properly relied upon the EPA's National
Priorities Listing policy, which provided a preference for abandoned sites
on the Superfund List.' Since Rohm and Haas were willing to take on

74. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(c)(8) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1274.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 1278.
Id.
Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1278.
Id. at 1268.
53 Fed. Reg. 30,005 (1988) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1994)).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol 35

the responsibility of cleaning up the site, they refused to enter into the
CERCLA consent order.' The CERCLA consent order, which Rohm and
Haas rejected, provided reimbursement for the government's oversight
costs, including its investigation, supervision, internal salaries, and
contractor's costs.
The EPA subsequently agreed to manage the site under RCRA
and not CERCLA." Its decision was consistent with the RCRA/National Priorities Listing Policy, given Rohm & Haas' willingness to
negotiate to take corrective action to investigate further, clean up the
landfill, and pay for the cleanup.' Extensive negotiation between
counsel for the EPA and Rohm and Haas ensued, but reimbursement of
EPA oversight costs were never discussed." Significantly, the Administrative Order agreed upon by both parties did not contain a provision for
reimbursement of the EPA's oversight costsY However, both parties
agreed to the wording contained in the consent order on the basis that it
reserved rights in the government, and leaving for future determination
the specific nature of those rights.' In addition, both parties agreed to
reserve Rohm and Haas' rights to assert its legal position in the event of
future disputes, except as expressly waived in the consent order.
Despite prolonged negotiations and both parties' intentions to
rectify the situation in the most efficient manner, litigation nevertheless
ensued. Rohm and Haas had at all times accepted responsibility for
pollution of the site and was willing to bear the cost of the cleanup, but
it did not expect to have to bear the additional cost of the government's
oversight activities, which the company viewed as an unfair, open-ended
liability. 90

83. 2 F.3d at 1268.
84. Id. The EPA informed Rohm and Haas that it had agreed to manage the site under
RCRA on February 4, 1987; the EPA then proposed to delete the site from the proposed
NPL on June 24, 1988. See 53 Fed. Reg. 23,978, 23,984 (1988). The district court found, as a
matter of fact, that "at all times, Rohm and Haas was ready, willing and able to correct the
waste conditions at the site." 790 F. Supp at 1260.
85. The EPA's NPL policy identifies three kinds of facilities that would satisfy the "inability"
or "unwillingness" criteria for listing: (a) facilities whose owners are bankrupt, (b) facilities that

have lost authorization to operate and for which there are additional indications that the
owners or operators are unwilling to undertake corrective action, and (c) facilities that have
not lost authorization to operate but whose owners or operators have a clear history of
unwillingness, as determined on a case-by-case basis, to undertake corrective action. See 51

Fed. Reg. 21,054,21,057-58 (1986); 53 Fed. Reg. 23,978,23,981,23,984 (1988); 53 Fed. Reg. 30,005
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1994)).

86. 790 F. Supp. at 1260.
87. Id.
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. See Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at x, U.S. v Rohm and Haas 2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir.

1993)(No. 92-1517).
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To promote private performance and payment of cleanups of
hazardous substances, and to preserve Superfund money for sites where
private sources of payment are not available, the EPA promulgated a
policy whereby facilities subject to both CERCLA and RCRA are
managed under RCRA and not placed on the Superfund List, except
where the owner or operator of the facility is bankrupt or has demonstrated an unwillingness to undertake corrective action. 91 As a result,
the EPA necessarily plays a large role in determining what response
action is appropriate. As the court noted, "fu]ltimately, it is EPA that
decides whether to conduct a response action under CERCLA section 104
or require private corrective action under CERCLA section 106 or RCRA
section 3008(h), 7003."' In this case, the EPA arguably could have
invoked either law, but in accordance with its RCRA/NPL deferral policy
chose to proceed under RCRA despite the fact that RCRA did not
explicitly authorize recovery of EPA's costs.
The court reiterates throughout its opinion that section 106 is the
preferred method of cleanup and its effectiveness should not be impaired
by allowing the government to recover oversight costs where the cleanup
is paid for and performed by private parties. Forcing private companies
such as Rohm and Haas to bear the government's oversight costs under
such circumstances removes the incentive for private action cleanup.
B. Ramifications of the Court's Decision
In cases involving statutory interpretation, courts are essentially
asked to second-guess congressional intent in drafting the underlying
disputed statues. The Rohm and Haas court was unwilling to read into a
statute an interpretation that would effect a major policy change. In the
present case, the court felt that relying on the EPA's interpretation of
"removal" would result in "a directive that EPA would henceforth be able
to recover all of the costs of overseeing private correction actions under any
applicable environmental statute [representing] a major policy change.""
Congress established the Superfund to provide money for both
immediate government responses and long-term cleanups "where a liable
party does not clean up, cannot be found, or cannot pay the costs of cleanup
and compensation." Congress originally created a $1.6 billion Superfund
program and in 1986 increased the amount to $8.5 billion.95 However, the

91. See EPA, RCRA/NPL Listing Policy, 51 Fed. Reg. 21,054,21,057-59 (1986) (codified at
40 C.F.R § 300 (1994)).
92. 2 F.3d at 1272.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See SARA, Pub. L No. 99-499, § 111, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
%11(a) (1988 & Supp. 1984)).
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estimated cost of waste site cleanups far exceeds the money available from
Superfund.9 With the total number of contaminated sites in the United
States so large (the General Accounting Office estimated the potential
hazardous waste sites to number between 130,000 and 425,000), in 1987,
seven years after CERCLA was enacted, the EPA already had a backlog of
more than 30,000 potential Superfund sites. " Accordingly, the task of
cleaning up hazardous waste sites in the United States seems beyond the
ability of the federal government alone.
Realistically, therefore, if most hazardous waste sites are to be
cleaned up, most of the work will have to be done by private parties who
may then seek reimbursement for their expenditures from other legally
responsible parties by private costs recovery actions provided for in
CERCLA. Private costs recovery is consistent with Congress' intent that
responsible parties provide the bulk of cleanup costs. If the court were to
allow oversight costs to be recovered by the government, then removal
activities conducted by private parties would not be as cost-effective or as
efficient. Such a result essentially removes much of the incentive for private
corrective actions.
Furthermore, as the court noted, allowing agencies to pass along
administrative costs to private parties would eliminate the agencies'
"incentive to operate efficiently and accountably. "" Many government
enforcement actions result in the responsible parties agreeing to handle the
cleanups themselves. The government nevertheless often seeks some level
of recovery from the parties for past and future investigating and monitoring of the site. The Rohm and Haas decision has considerably reduced the
amount which EPA can expect to recover for these activities, either through
judicial determination or through settlement, because potentially responsible parties can now argue that the agency has no statutory entitlement to
the costs at all. Such a policy provides incentive for agencies to operate
efficiently. At the same time, the court's ruling encourages private parties
to perform cleanups themselves because they would be spared the costs of
government oversight, possibly an open-ended liability.
Lastly, keeping in mind that Congress intended CERCLA to be
cumulative and not merely art alternative to RCRA, this ruling is, nevertheless, the first in which the government has replenished the Superfund by
%. At the time of CERCLA's enactment, the EPA estimated that the hazardous waste
problem would cost over $44 billion to remedy. H.R. Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., pt.
1, at 70-71 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6146.
97. U.S. General Accounting Office, Superfund: Extent of Nation's Potential Hazardous
Waste Problem Still Unknown 3 (1987). At the time Congress adopted CERCLA, the EPA
estimated that there were between 30,000 and 50,000 hazardous waste sites in the United
States, and that 1,200 to 2,000 of these sites posed a serious risk to public health. H.R. Rep.
No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6120.
98. 2 F.3d at 1274.
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using the statutory provisions contained in CERCLA in litigation over a
non-Superfund site. Had the court ruled the other way and upheld the
district court decision, then the government should be able to recover such
costs incident to enforcement actions under the Clean Air Act, the Clean
Water Act, and other environmental statutes.? Without explicit language
to display such intent, the court was reluctant to effectuate an outcome that
would constitute a major policy change for the EPA.
A policy emphasizing EPA response actions over private cleanups
would inevitably result in cleanup delays due to limited Superfund money,
limiting CERCLA's ability to address the threat of the thousands of
remaining hazardous wastes sites. Finally, a contrary decision would
provide little incentive for the EPA to be judicious in incurring oversight
costs, resulting in inefficient and costly dissipation of finite resources for
actual cleanup work.
V. CONCLUSION
While CERCLA cases have been filtering through the courts
nationwide at a phenomenal rate, this particular CERCLA case is significant
in that it should promote faster, more efficient fulfillment of CERCLA's
purpose by encouraging private cleanup efforts. Furthermore, the Rohm and
Haas decision fosters the use of CERCLA section 106 over sections 104 and
107, a result that was of particular significance to the court. A contrary
decision would impede section 106's effectiveness; to allow the government
to recover oversight costs serves an impediment to hazardous waste site
cleanup because it removes the incentive for private parties to bear the
burdens and costs of the cleanups. Additionally, it is fundamentally unfair
for the government to induce responsible parties to perform a private
cleanup in the reasonable belief that they are taking on certain responsibilities, which did not include, for example, paying the EPA's contractors, and
then pursue them in court for additional costs. Ultimately, this decision
contributes to the goals of CERCLA by fostering private cleanup efforts,
alleviating the burden on the government and encouraging speedier action
on the part of the potentially responsible parties. Most notably, the Third
Circuit's decision is consistent with CERCLA's original stated goal and
purpose, of protecting the public health by cleaning up our environment in
the most cost-effective manner.
[Editor's Note: CERCLA will expire in 1995 if not reauthorized by
Congress. In 1994 the Clinton Administration, on behalf of the President,
99. Since the enforcement provisions in CERCLA do not contain any unique language that
would distinguish them from their corresponding counterparts in other environmental
statutes such as the Clean Water Act or the Clean Air Act, the court interpreted CERCLA
to operate similarly.
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submitted a proposal to reform CERCLA during the 103rd Congress. See
R. Bartelt and D. Polter, Summary of the Proposed Superfund Reform Act of
1994, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 608 (1994). The proposed legislation, entitled
Superfund Reform Act of 1994, would overrule Rohm and Haasby inserting
dear language allowing the EPA to recover oversight costs of cleanup
actions conducted by private parties. To avoid giving the EPA free reign in
imposing oversight costs, however, the proposed legislation required the
EPA to base the direct and indirect oversight costs it may recover on a
national percentage rate, calculated from actual experience, not to exceed
ten percent of the total response costs incurred by the responsible parties.
The proposed legislation failed in 1994, and will be resubmitted in 1995 for
passage through the 104th Congress.)
ELzABETH M. WEE

